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LESSONS IN HUMANITY: DIVERSITY AS
A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION
I was friends with sons of furriers as well as factory workers. I had
white and black bowling partners . . . . The interracial friendships
taught me about individual humanity in a racist country . . . . 1
INTRODUCTION
As affirmative action programs at public universities across the
country are being challenged and dismantled, the scope of attack has
broadened in recent years to include racially-sensitive admissions poli-
cies at the public elementary and secondary school level. The nation's
best public schools—whether prestigious exam high schools such as
Boston Latin or Bronx Science, or specialized magnet elementary
schools—must often develop admissions policies because they are un-
able to accept all interested students.? Recognizing the importance of
diversity in the classroom, many public schools have adopted admis-
sions policies that take race and ethnicity into account. In the last few
years, the racially sensitive admissions policies of at least four public
schools have been challenged as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.' Constitutional arguments against affirmative action policies im-
1 See Derrick Z. Jackson, My Vehicle to the American Dream, BOSTON GLoax, Jan. IS, 1999, at
M9. This is an excerpt from a recent op-ed piece regarding Jackson's childhood experience with
Boston's METCO busing. See id. METCO is a program, in operation for over thirty years, which
buses thousands of children from Boston's inner city to suburban schools in an effort to deseg-
regate schools and bring about racial harmony and educational advantages for all children in
Boston. See Rosalie Griesse, Ending Mena Would Be Irresponsible, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 6052922.
2 Magnet programs in schools accept children from all over the city or county, rather than
only within a given school district. In addition, these schools often offer enhanced curriculum.
Exam schools are prestigious public secondary schools which admit students from all over the
county or city based on students' exam scores as well as other defined criteria, such as grade
point average.
3 See U.S. CoNs.r. amend. XIV:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;
see also Wessmann v. Cittens, 160 F.3d 790, 800 (1st Cir. 1998); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451 (D. Md. 1998).
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plemented in the workplace, the marketplace and higher education
have been extended recently to the arena of public elementary and
secondary schools in a number of lawsuits challenging public school
admissions and transfer policies. 4 In the wake of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit decision in Wessmann v. Gittens in Novem-
ber of 1998, which struck down a racially-sensitive admissions policy at
Boston Latin School while assuming that diversity was a compelling
state interest, the challenge is to establish empirically and concretely
the value of diversity through results from long-term educational re-
search.'
In light of the unique mission of public schools, pedagogical
theory and recent longitudinal research supporting diversity in the
classroom, the U.S. Supreme Court should regard public kindergarten
through twelfth grade ("K-12") education as a context distinct from
the workplace, the marketplace and higher education, in which diver-
sity does serve a compelling state interest.' This Note argues that the
achievement of a diverse student body in public K—I 2 education should
be regarded as a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny stand-
ard of review' Part I examines the most recent United States Supreme
Court decisions addressing the constitutionality of affirmative action
policies. Part II discusses the affirmative action case law at the U.S.
Court of Appeals and District Court level." Part III analyzes the legal
4 See, e.g., Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 800; Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 453-54.
5 See 160 F.3d at 800; Kate Zernike, Diversity's Rainbow Fading into Abstract Idea, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 20, 1998, at B6. Since the Wessman v. Gittens decision, the prospects for racially
diverse classrooms in Boston have become even more bleak. See id. On July 14, 1999, the Boston
School Committee voted to eliminate race as a factor in deciding where students go to school—a
move that would end the desegregation efforts that began with busing in 1974. See Kate Zernike
& Doreen ludica Vigue, Ex-Foes Join as End OK'd to Schools Race Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, JUL 15,
1999, at Al. The new system will still offer parents a choice of where to send their children, but
rather than considering a student's race, schools will look at a student's lottery results, where
siblings are in school, and how close a student lives to a school. See id. Many believe the School
Committee's decision signified their "caving in" to a recent lawsuit filed by a small group of white
students who claimed the assignment plan discriminated against them. See id. Boston Superin-
tendent of Schools Thomas Payzant admitted that, given recent court decisions against racial
preferences, the 'School Committee) vote simply could not wait. See jay Lindsay, Boston Ends
Race-Based Busing,. BOSTON GLOBE, Jul. 15, 1999. Nevertheless, critics fear the new assignment
plan will lead to the same segregation that the 1974 court order sought to eliminate. See Zernicke
& Vigue, supra at Al.
The unique mission of public schools was announced in Brown a. Board of Education as:
"the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954).
7 See infra notes 11-71 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 72-140 and accompanying text.
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framework as it applies to diversity in the public school context and
argues that in light of extensive pedagogical research supporting the
benefits of school desegregation, diversity should be regarded as a
compelling state interest.9 Part III further argues that the reasoning
from U.S. Supreme Court desegregation case law should be adopted
and used to support the achievement of diversity in public education.i°
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES:
RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Equal Protection Analysis and Strict Scrutiny
In the last few decades, affirmative action and racial preferencing
programs have been challenged as violating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion." The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that government clas-
sifications will not be based on impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used
to burden individuals." Specifically, the clause mandates that no gov-
ernment entity shall burden persons or deny a benefit to them because
they are members of a racial minority."
Under the Equal Protection guarantee, the Court uses a "strict
scrutiny" standard of review when a government classification distin-
guishes between persons based upon some "suspect" classification.' 4 In
addition, courts must apply strict scrutiny even if the classification is
"benign" discrimination: a classification that operates to aid a group
that historically has been the subject of governmental discrimination."
Thus, the Court has applied strict scrutiny in the context of challenges
to affirmative action and other minority preferencing policies." All
racial classifications imposed by federal, state or local government must
be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard." Under a strict scrutiny
9 See infra notes 141-292 and accompanying text.
1 ° See generally Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); infra notes
293-340 and accompanying text.
11 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 270 (1978); Wessmann v. Gittens,
160 F.3d 790, 794 (1st Cir. 1998); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
12 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
11 See id.
14 See id. at 227-28. In light of historical discrimination against racial minorities, laws that
classify persons on the basis of race or national origin will be deemed "suspect" and subject to
this strict standard of review. See Koretnatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
15 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986).
to see, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 468 U.S. 469, 505 (1989).
17 See Adarancl, 515 U.S. at 227.
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standard of review, courts will not defer to the decisions of other
branches of government, but instead will determine independently
whether the classification is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental purpose. 18
B. The United States Supreme Court Decisions Addressing Affirmative
Action Policies
To date the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed squarely the
constitutionality of racial preferencing programs employed by public
schools.' 9
 The Court last considered affirmative action in the 1978 case,
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 2° In Bakke, the United
States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the special admissions
program at the University of California, Davis Medical School
("Davis"), while also holding that an educational institution was not
enjoined from according any consideration of race in the admissions
process." The Davis admissions program employed a strict set-aside,
reserving sixteen out of one-hundred positions in its class for appli-
cants who were "members of specified minority groups, including:
African Americans, Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians. "22 The
applications of these candidates were forwarded to a special admissions
committee and rated by the committee." Minority applicants did not
have to meet the 2.5 grade-point average cut-off that applied to non-
minority applicants." The committee then recommended "special"
applicants until the school admitted sixteen "minority" applicants."
Alan Bakke, a white male, applied to the Davis Medical School in 1973
' 8 See id.
19 See Wessnaann v. Boston Sch. Comm., 996 F. Supp. 120, 129 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing Hunter
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (stating no majority of the
[Supreme] Court has ever explicitly held that remedial action may constitute the only valid
compelling state interest")).
"See 438 U.S. 265, 270 (1978).
21 See id. Four justices (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun) believed the goal of
admitting students who are disadvantaged by the effects of past discrimination (remedying prior
discrimination by the government) was sufficiently important and found the Davis Medical School
admissions policy constitutional. See id. at 325. Four justices (Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and
Rehnquist) invalidated the plan on statutory grounds. See id. at 421. Justice Powell wrote the
deciding opinion, in which he agreed with the Brennan Four that Davis should be able to take
an applicant's race into account (employing different reasoning, as explained below), but found
Davis' policy of reserving places in the class which could only be filled by minorities was uncon-
stitutional. See id. at 271-72.
22 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75.
23 See id.
24
 See id. at 275.
" See id.
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and 1974 and was denied admission twice. 26 Bakke brought suit against
Davis, challenging the special admissions policy under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking injunctive
relief compelling his admission. 27
Announcing the Court's judgment, Justice Powell concluded that
while racial and ethnic classifications of any sort are inherently suspect
under the Equal Protection Clause and require strict scrutiny, the goal
of achieving a diverse student body is clearly a constitutionally permis-
sible goal for an institution of higher education. 2° Affirming diversity's
educational value, Justice Powell reasoned that the atmosphere of
"speculation, experiment and creation," essential to the quality of
higher education, is promoted by a diverse student body. 29 Justice
Powell noted the right of universities to select those students who will
contribute to the most "robust exchange of ideas" implicates a coun-
tervailing constitutional interest—that of the First Amendment. 3°
Despite finding diversity to be a compelling state interest, Justice
Powell ruled that Davis' rigid set-aside was not narrowly tailored and
thus invalid." Justice Powell cautioned that applicants must be consid-
ered as individuals and that race must be only one factor in the
admissions process.nDiversity that furthers a compelling state interest,
Justice Powell reasoned, encompasses a far broader array of qualifica-
tions and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single,
though important, element." Justice Powell cited to Harvard College's
admissions program, which admits the top 150 academic students and
26 See id. at 275, 277-78.
" See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-79.
211 See id. at 311-12 (Powell, J.).
22 Id. at 312.
" See id. at 312-13 (Powell, J.). In addition, Justice Powell articulates the importance of
diversity at the graduate level:
[0] ur tradition and experience lend support to the view that the contribution of
diversity is substantial . . . Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An oth-
erwise qualified medical student with a particular background—whether it be
ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged—may bring to a profes-
sional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training
of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding
their vital service to humanity.
Id. at 313-14 (Powell, J.).
31 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15, 319-20.
32 See id. at 315. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined the part of Justice
Powell's opinion which held that a university should be able to take an applicant's race into
consideration, but these four Justices employed different reasoning. See id. at 324-25. In their
concurrence, the Brennan Four reasoned that the goal of remedying prior discrimination by the
government is a sufficiently compelling interest. See id. at 325.
33 See id. at 315.
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then, when reviewing a large middle group of "admissible" applicants,
considers race, as well as geographical origin, life experience and
ethnicity, one of many "plus" factors. 34 Justice Powell found this admis-
sions policy flexible enough in its consideration of all pertinent ele-
ments of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each ap-
plicant." Thus, although the Court declared that Davis' admissions
policy's explicit set-aside based on race was unconstitutional, it never-
theless held that an educational institution was not enjoined from any
consideration of race in the admissions process."
The Supreme Court went on to address affirmative action in
the education context in 1986. 37 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, a divided Court held that a collective bargaining agreement,
which extended protection against layoffs to some school employees
because of their race, violated the Fourteenth Amendment." The chal-
lenged agreement, negotiated by the Jackson, Michigan Board of Edu-
cation and its teachers union, provided that, regardless of seniority,
minority teachers would not be laid off in greater proportion than
their existing percentage in the school system."
The Court rejected the argument that providing role models for
minority students justified the race-conscious layoff program because
the role model theory was based on societal discrimination rather than
specific and identifiable past discrimination by the Board. 4° Thus, the
Court found that the plan had "no logical stopping point." 41 The Court
further concluded that the layoff plan was not narrowly tailored be-
cause other, less intrusive means of retaining minority teachers were
available. 42
 The Court, therefore, held that the collective bargaining
agreement extending preferential treatment to minority school teach-
ers violated the Equal Protection Clause. 43
34 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17, 321-24.
35 See id. at 316-19, 323.
36 See id. at 220 (Powell, J.).
37 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
38 See id. at 283-84.
39 See id. at 270-71.
4° See id. at 274-75.
41 See id.
42 See litant, 476 U.S. at 283-84.
43 See id. It is important to note, however, that Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion left
open the possibility of recognizing diversity as a compelling state interest. See id. at 286 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring) ("Although its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the promo-
don of racial diversity has been found sufficiently compelling at least in the context of higher
education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest ... certainly
nothing the Court has said today necessarily forecloses the possibility that the Court will find
other government interests which have been relied upon in the lower courts but which have not
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Declining to revisit the constitutionality of affirmative action in
the education context, the U.S. Supreme Court instead has most re-
cently addressed affirmative action policies in the government con-
tracting context." In City of Richmond v. Croson, a 1989 decision, the
Court struck down a municipal set-aside program that required prime
contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least
thirty percent of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more
"Minority Business Enterprises" ("MBEs") .45
In September 1983, J.A. Croson Company, a mechanical plumbing
and heating contractor, received bid forms issued by the city on a
project for the provision and installation of plumbing fixtures at a city
jail.° In October, 1983, Croson submitted a request for a waiver of the
city's required thirty percent set-aside, indicating that one MBE was
unqualified and the other MBEs he had contacted had been unrespon-
sive or unable to quote a bid. 47 The city denied Croson's request for a
waiver on two occasions and ultimately decided to rebid the project.°
Croson subsequently brought suit against the city, challenging the
constitutionality of the Richmond ordinance requiring the thirty per-
cent set-aside.49
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor reasoned that classifica-
tions based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harrn. 5° She added that
unless classifications are reserved for remedial settings, they may in
fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to racial hostility. 51
The Court found that the city failed to demonstrate, with specificity,
evidence that their own spending practices had exacerbated a pattern
of discrimination in the Richmond construction industry." Thus, the
Court reasoned, the city could not make the argument that it was
been passed on here to be sufficiently important or compelling to sustain the use of affirmative
action policies.").
44 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Metro Broad., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600-01 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Grogan, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989);
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
45 See 488 U.S. at 478, 511. "Minority Business Enterprises" were defined as a business at least
51% of which is owned and controlled by minority group members. See id. at 488 U.S. at 478.
"Minority group members" were defined as citizens of the United States who are Blacks, Span-
ish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos or Aleuts. See id.
46 See id. at 481.
47 See id. at 482.
4° See Crossett, 488 U.S. at 483.
" See id. at 483.
m See id. at 493-94.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 505.
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remedying effects of prior discrimination.53 The Court further rea-
soned that the use of racial preferences based on nothing more than
societal discrimination is "amorphous" and would result in "a mosaic
of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of
past wrongs. "54 Finding that the city failed to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest, the Court struck down Richmond's apportion-
ment of public contracting opportunities as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution."
In 1990, one year after Croson, the Court held that the minority
ownership preferencing program instituted by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC") did not violate equal protection princi-
ples in Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission. 56
The FCC initiated two racial preferences: one that gave minority-
owned businesses an advantage in comparative license proceedings
and another that allowed licensees who were on the verge of losing
their licenses to sell to minority-owned businesses at distress-sale
prices.57 The preference programs were intended to increase program-
ming oriented toward minorities by increasing minority ownership of
broadcast licenses."
The Metro Broadcasting Court applied an intermediate, rather
than a strict, standard of review to the "benign" federal preferencing
program.59 Relying on Justice Powell's diversity rationale in Bakke, the
Court found a legitimate government interest in the achievement of
broadcast diversity." The Court reasoned that just as a diverse student
body is a constitutionally permissible goal on which a race-conscious
university admissions program may be predicated because it contrib-
utes to a "robust exchange of ideas," the diversity of views and infor-
mation on the airwaves serves important First Amendment values. 61
The Court found the benefits of such diversity are not limited to the
members of minority groups who gain access to the broadcasting
" See Croson, 488 U.S. at 511.
54 See id at 499, 505-06.
" See id. at 511.
56 See 497 U.S. 547, 600-01 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995).
51 See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 556-58 (1990).
58 See id. at 554-58.
" See id. at 564-66. The FCC's program was regarded as benign because it operated against
a group (whites) that historically had not been the subject of governmental discrimination.
60 See id. at 567-68; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
61 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
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industry by virtue of the ownership policies. 62 Rather, the Court rea-
soned, the benefits would be shared by all members of the viewing and
listening audience who would gain from having access to a wider
diversity of information sources.° Thus, the Court sustained the FCC's
use of racial preferencing programs in Metro Broadcasting. 64
In 1995, the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, holding that all racial classifications —regardless
of "benign motivation"—must be reviewed under a strict scrutiny
standard.° In Adarand, the terms of a prime contract awarded by the
Central Federal Lands Highway Division of the United States Depart-
ment of Transportation provided that the awarded company, Mountain
Gravel, would receive additional compensation if it hired subcontrac-
tors certified as small businesses controlled by "socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals."66 Adarand, a subcontractor, did not
fall into the category of businesses controlled by "socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals."67 Despite Adarand's lower bid, Moun-
tain Gravel awarded the subcontract to Gonzales, a "socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged" business, because of the additional payment
Mountain Gravel received for hiring Gonzales. 68 Adarand filed suit,
claiming the federal government's practice of giving general contrac-
tors on government projects a financial incentive to hire subcontrac-
tors controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individu-
als" violated Equal Protection principles. 69
The Court reasoned that the "good intentions" of the federal
government does not lower the standard of review for a racial prefer-
encing program, as even a well-intentioned preference may exacerbate
racial prejudice. 7° The Court disputed the notion that strict scrutiny is
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact" and suggested that racial classifica-
ss
	 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 568.
63 See id. The Court also relied on Justice O'Connor's opinion in 145tant, which left open
the possibility that the Court may find other compelling governmental interests. See id. at n.15;
Wygatit v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64 See 497 U.S. at 600-01.
SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995), on remand, 965 F. Supp.
1556 (D. Colo. 1997) (finding racial preferencing program not narrowly tailored and thus
unconstitutional), vacated, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.Sd 1292 (10th Cir. 1999).
66 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205-06. Federal law provided that "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals," include African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Asian. Pacific Americans, and other minorities or any other individual found to be disadvantaged
by the Small Business Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. See id.
See id.
68 See id.
" See id. at 204.
70 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228-29.
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tions can sometimes be sustained.'n Nevertheless, the Court held that
all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state or local
actors, must be analyzed under strict scrutiny." The Court remanded
the case to determine whether the federal program satisfied strict
scrutiny.'"
IL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES IN THE EDUCATION CONTEXT:
RECENT U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT
COURT DECISIONS
A. The opinion in Hopwood v. Texas
In the last decade, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
have attempted to interpret the meaning of the Bakke, Wygant, Croson
and Adarand opinions in order to determine whether diversity may
serve a compelling state interest in the education context. 74 In 1996,
in Hopwood v. Texas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the University of Texas School of Law's racial prefer-
encing admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." The law school based its initial admissions
decisions on an applicant's "Texas Index" ("Tr), a composite of un-
dergraduate grade point average and Law School Admissions Test
("LSAT") score." The law school placed the typical applicant in one
of three categories: "presumptive admit," "presumptive deny" or a
middle "discretionary zone."77 An applicant's TI category determined
how extensive a review his or her application would receive." African
Americans and Mexican Americans, however, were treated differently
from other candidates." Compared to whites and non-preferred mi-
71 See id. at 237.
72 See id at 237-39.
73 See id
74 See id. at 200, 257-58 (Stevens and Ginsburg, Jj., dissenting); City of Richmond v. Croson,
488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Rd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 270 (1978).
75 See 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
76 See id. at 935.
77 See id. In March, 1992, a TI of 199 or above fell within the "presumptive admit" category.
See id. at 936. A TI of 193-98 fell within the "discretionary zone" for white applicants. See id. The
presumptive deny score for whites and non-preferred minorities was 192. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d
at 936.
76 See id. Applicants in the middle range—the "discretionary zone"—received the most
extensive scrutiny. See id.
79 See id. at 936-38. African Americans and Mexican Americans were the only minority
categories granted preferential treatment in admissions, because only African Americans and
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norities, the TI ranges that were used to place African Americans and
Mexican Americans into the three admissions categories were lowered
to allow the law school to consider and admit more members of these
groups.8° For example, an African-American or Mexican-American can-
didate with a TI of 189 or above almost certainly would be admitted,
even though his or her score was considerably below the level at which
a white candidate almost certainly would be rejected." In addition to
maintaining separate presumptive TI levels for minorities and whites,
the law school ran a segregated application evaluation process: African
Americans' and Mexican Americans' applications were reviewed by a
subcommittee of three that met and discussed every minority candi-
date.82
Plaintiffs Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliott and
David Rogers applied for admission to the 1992 entering law school
class at the University of Texas. 83 All four were white residents of Texas,
all were "discretionary zone candidates" and all four plaintiffs were
denied admission." The plaintiffs brought suit under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that the law
school discriminated against them unconstitutionally."
The Fifth Circuit held that diversity is not a compelling state
interest, reasoning that because Justice Powell wrote alone in Bakke
and no other justice joined in the part of his opinion discussing
diversity as a compelling state interest, the diversity rationale is not
binding precedent.86 In addition, the Fifth Circuit found that recent
Supreme Court precedent indicated diversity will not satisfy the strict
Mexican Americans received 	 benefit of a separate admissions track. See id. at 936 n.4. Native
Americans, Asian Americans, and non-Mexican Hispanic Americans did not receive preferential
treatment in admissions. See Harwood, 78 F.3d at 936 n.4.
80 See id. at 936. While the presumptive TI admission score for resident whites and non-pre-
ferred minorities was 199, Mexican Americans and African Americans needed a TI of only 189
to be presumptively admitted. See id. In addition, while the presumptive deny score for whites
and non-preferred minorities was 192, the presumptive deny score for African Americans and
Mexican Americans was 179. See id.
61 See Id. at 936-37.
62 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 937.
88 See id. at 938.
84 See id. Each plaintiff scored just below the "presumptive admit" category for resident white
applicants, which was a TI of 199 or above. See id. at 936-38. Three plaintiffs scored a 197 and
one plaintiff, Hopwood, scored a 199. See id. at 938.
"See Hopwood, 78 F.3(1 at 938.
88 See id. at 944. Although Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in
the part ofJustice Powell's opinion in which he held that a university should be able to take race
into account as part of an admissions policy, the Brennan Four wrote in their concurring opinion
not of diversity as a compelling state interest, but of the use of race to remedy the disadvantages
cast on minorities by past racial prejudice when findings are made. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325.
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scrutiny standard of review.° The Hopwood court reasoned that aside
from remedying effects of prior discrimination, the Supreme Court has
recognized no other compelling state interest as sufficient to withstand
strict scrutiny.88 Thus, finding that the University was not remedying
effects of prior discrimination, the court declared the law school's
admissions policy unconstitutional. 89
B. The History of Wessmann v. Gittens: The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit and the U.S. District Court Decisions
In 1998, two years after the Fifth Circuit considered the constitu-
tionality of affirmative action in higher education, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the issue of whether
diversity may serve a compelling state interest in the public high school
context.9° In Wessmann v. Boston School Committee ("Wessmann 1"), the
Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts upheld the
racially-sensitive admissions program of Boston Latin School ("BLS"),
holding that the achievement of a diverse student body is a compelling
state interest in public intermediate and secondary school education 9I
In November of the same year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit struck down the BLS admissions policy as unconstitu-
tional in Wessmann v. Gittens ("Wessmann 11"). 92
Plaintiff Sara Wessmann ranked ninety-first among applicants to
BLS's ninety-seat ninth grade class for the 1997-98 academic year. 93 If
straight composite score rank order and student preference had been
applied to all ninety seats, students ranking between one and ninety-
87 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 344-45. The Fifth Circuit relied on Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Croson, which stated that unless reserved for remedial settings, racial preferencing may in fact
promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to politics of racial hostility. See id.; Croson, 488
U.S. at 493-94.
88 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-45. The court further relied on Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Metro Broadcasting, in which she states that diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a
compelling interest. See id. at 945; Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The Hopwood court also read Adarand to have overruled Metro Broadcasting, not only
by announcing that the correct form of review for racial classification is always strict scrutiny, but
also by casting doubt as to the precedential value of Metro Broadcasting, which held that the
diversity interest was important" under an "intermediate standard" of review. See Hopwood, 78
F.3d at 945; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238-39 (1995).
" See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948.
9° See id.; Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 799-800 (1st Cir. 1998) [hereinafter "Wessmann
"See 996 F. Supp. 120, 132 (D. Mass. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Wessman II, 160 F.3d at 800
[hereinafter " Wessman p].
92 See 160 F.3d at 808-09.
93 See Wessmann 1, 996 F. Supp. at 127.
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eight, including Wessmann, would have been admitted.94 Wessmann
was denied admission even though her composite score was higher
than eight African-American students, three Hispanic students, and
one Asian student who were admitted to BLS because of an admissions
policy that allowed for flexible racial/ethnic considerations." Wess-
mann challenged the constitutionality of BLS's admissions policy un-
der the Equal Protection Clause."
Under the BLS admissions policy, half of the class was admitted
based solely on the composite exam score ranking, while half of the
students were admitted on the basis of a composite score ranking in
conjunction with flexible racial/ethnic guidelines." In order to be
eligible for the exam school, a student had to rank in the top half of
the overall applicant pool." After the first half of the class was admitted
based on their exam scores alone, the remaining seats were allocated
according to composite score rank, in proportion to the racial/ethnic
composition of the school's "Remaining Qualified Applicant Poor"
The flexible nature of the policy was designed to provide BLS with a
student body that reflects the racial and ethnic diversity of the "Re-
maining Qualified Applicant Pool."'" Thus, the policy had no fixed
set-aside because the ethnic mix of the "Remaining Qualified Appli-
cant Pool" would vary from year to year, and so too would the ra-
cial/ethnic composition of each admitted class. 1 °1
In Wessmann I the court distinguished the unique context at issue,
emphasizing that the particular litigation was not about the value of
diversity in the workplace, the marketplace or in graduate education,
but about diversity in a public high school.'" The court reasoned that
more than any other public institution, public schools awaken children
to cultural values and practices of civility that lead to tolerance and
understanding of divergent political, religious and social convictions.'"
94 See id. Composite score exam ranking is a combination of results on the ISEE examination
and the student's grade point average. See id. at 125. Seven students with scores higher than Sara's
designated exam schools other than Boston Latin as their first choice. See id, at 127.
95 See id
96 See Wessman I, 996 F. Supp. at 121.
97 See id. at 125-26.
99 See id. at 125. Students who rank in the top half of the Total Applicant Pool are designated
as the "Qualified Applicant Pool." See id.
99 See id. at 126. Students in the "Qualified Applicant Pool" who do not make the initial 50%
admissions cut-off, based solely on exam score, at any examination school are designated as the
school's "Remaining Qualified Applicant Pool." See Wessman I, 996 F. Supp. at 126.
loo See id.
1" See id. at 126 n.6.
102 See id. at 127-28.
1°5 See id. at 128.
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Specifically, the court attempted to distinguish Wessmann /from Hop-
wood by citing to McLaughlin v. Boston School Committee. In McLaughlin,
the court recognized a fundamental distinction between an urban
public school, such as Boston Latin, and the University of Texas School
of Law, "where the educational mission is so obviously different from
that of a public secondary school in a racially diverse municipality." 104
In addition, the court distinguished Wessmann I from recent United
States Supreme Court decisions dealing with affirmative action in the
marketplace because those cases dealt with regulations awarding mu-
nicipal and federal construction contracts, and not with "the authority
of a school committee to make student assignments on the combined
criteria of academic achievement and racial/ethnic sensitivity."105 By
distinguishing the unique factual context in Wessmann I, the court
concluded it was not bound by the U.S. Supreme Court case law
regarding affirmative action in the marketplace, nor was it bound by
Hopwood. 106
The court further adopted Justice Powell's reasoning in Bakke that
an otherwise qualified student with a particular background—whether
it be ethnic, geographiC, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged—may
bring to a school experiences, outlooks and ideas that enrich the
training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render
with understanding their vital services to humanity.' 07 The court em-
phasized that no Supreme Court decision has held that diversity is not
a compelling state interestms in the context of intermediate and secon-
104 See Wessman I, 996 F. Supp. at 128; McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm. 938 F. Supp. 1001,
1009 (D. Mass. 1996). In McLaughlin, the plaintiff Julia McLaughlin challenged the Boston
School Committee's admissions policy, which set aside 35% of seats available at the three public
exam schools for African-American and Hispanic students, on equal protection grounds. See 938
F. Supp. at 1018. The court struck down the Boston School Committee's admissions policy on
Equal Protection grounds, finding the policy was not narrowly tailored, and granted Julia
McLaughlin admission to BLS. See id.
1°5
 See Wessmann I, 996 F. Supp. at 130; see also City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,
493-94 (1989); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238-39 (1995).
136 The Wessmann I court declined to adopt the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and attacked the
Hopwood holding, relying on criticism of Hopwood's conclusion that diversity may never be
considered a compelling governmental interest. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 963-65 (5th
Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., specially concurring); Wessman  I, 996 F. Supp. at 130; see also Hopwood v.
Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (Politz, C.J. King, Wiener, Benavides, Stewart,
Parker, Denise, J., dissenting from the failure to grant rehearing en bane).
107
 See Wessmann I, 996 F. Supp. at 129; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 311-17 {1978).
108
 See Wessmann I, 996 F. Supp. at 129, citing Hunter v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp.
1316, 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("[N]o majority of the (Supreme] Court has ever explicitly held that
remedial action may constitute the only valid compelling state interest."). In addition, the court
cited to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in ii5gant, which allowed for the possibility of
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dary education. Thus, the court in Wessmann I upheld BLS's consid-
eration of race and ethnicity as part of its admissions policy. 1®
In November of 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed the district court's decision in Wessman /."6 In
Wessmann II, the First Circuit found that while Bakke remains good law
and "diversity" might be sufficiently compelling in specific circum-
stances to justify race-conscious actions, the Boston School Commit-
tee's "abstract" and "generalized" diversity justification was not
sufficient to withstand constitutional muster.'" The First Circuit deter-
mined that it must look beyond the School Committee's "recital of
theoretical benefits of diversity" and inquire whether the concrete
workings of the policy merit constitutional sanction."' The court fur-
ther noted that only by particularized attention to specific details
would it be possible to ascertain whether the BLS policy bears any
necessary relation to the "noble ends it espouses?"'
The First Circuit found the policy's exclusive focus on racial and
ethnic diversity ran afoul of Bakke's guidance, which allows for diversity
policies that encompass a broad array of qualifications and charac-
teristics, of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single element. 114
Instead, the First Circuit regarded BLS's policy as a means for racial
balancing, rather than a means of attaining diversity in a constitution-
ally relevant sense, because the policy promoted groups over individu-
als."' By taking "race" and "ethnicity" into consideration, the First
Circuit reasoned that the policy was at odds with Justice Powell's un-
derstanding of the manner in which a diverse student body may be
attained."6
Finding that a "particularly strong showing of necessity" would be
required to justify racial preferencing, the First Circuit found that the
Committee failed to submit compelling evidence supporting the need
for or importance of racial balancing."' Finding that the Committee
recognizing diversity as a compelling state interest. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ, 476 U.S.
267,288 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
lug See Wessmann I, 996 F. Supp. at 132.
110 See Wessmann II, 160 F.3d at 809.
111 See id. at 796-98.
112 See id. at 797-98.
"3 1d. at 798 (noting that "the devil is in the details").
114 See id. at 797-98,800. The BLS policy only took into consideration five groups: African
Americans, whites, Latino/as, Asian Americans, and Native Americans. See Wessmann H, 160 F.3d
at 798.
116 See id. at 798.
"6 See id. at 799.
"7 See id. The court assumes, "albeit with considerable skepticism," that there may be circum-
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relied on broad generalizations constituting "rank speculation," the
First Circuit reasoned that the School Committee failed to show solid
and compelling evidence that the proportional representation pro-
moted by their policy was tied to "the vigorous exchange of ideas"
lauded in Bakke.'" Specifically, the First Circuit found that the Com-
mittee failed to demonstrate how the policy significantly affected stu-
dents' capacity and willingness to learn."9 Concluding that the Com-
mittee's policy did not meet the Bakke standard and that the concept
of diversity promoted by BLS did not justify a race-based preferencing
program, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit struck down
the racially-sensitive BLS admissions policy. 120
C. Additional District Court Cases Addressing the Issue of Diversity in
Public Education
Although the First Circuit recently struck down BLS's racially-sen-
sitive admissions policy, other U.S. District Courts have recognized that
the achievement of diversity may serve a compelling state interest in
the public education context.' 2 ' In Hunter v. Regents of the University of
California, a 1997 decision, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California held that the use of race-based admissions
criteria served a compelling state interest in operating a laboratory ele-
mentary school at the University of California, Los Angeles ("UCLA").
In that case, UCLA was charged with the task of conducting research
relevant to the improvement of the state's public education system.' 22
The mission of the Urban Elementary School ("UES"), a laboratory
elementary school composed of 460 children ages four to twelve, was
to conduct research relevant to urban educational experience and to
work with teachers, communities and schools to disseminate research
and foster a more effective system for urban elementary students.'" As
part of its admissions policy, UES considered an applicant's race and
ethnicity in an attempt to obtain an adequate cross-sample of the
general population for the purpose of maintaining the scientific credi-
stances under which a form of racial preferencing could be justified by concerns for attaining
goals articulated by the policy. See id. at 799-800.
118 See Wessmann II, 160 F.3d at 799-800; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
"See Wessmann II, 160 F.3r1 at 799-800.
I" See id. at 809.
121 See e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449,453-55 (D. Md.
1998); Hunter v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316,1327-30 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
122 See 971 F. Supp. at 1319-20,1327-30.
123 See id. at 1319. The UES was run by the Graduate School of Education and Information
Studies at UCLA. See id. at 1318-19.
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bility of its educational studies.'" For the 1995-96 school year, UES
sorted applicants into six racial and ethnic categories—African Ameri-
can, Asian American, Native American, Latino/a, Caucasian and Other
—and determined a target number from each racial/ethnic group
to be admitted. 1" Selection from within these groupings was accom-
plished by computer-generated random numbers. 126 Plaintiff Keeley
Tatsuyo Hunter brought suit challenging the constitutionality of UES's
admissions policy after she applied to UES for the 1995-96 school year
and was denied admission. 127
The court found the defendant's interest in operating a lab ele-
mentary school was analogous to the use of racial quotas to remedy ef-
fects of past discrimination because both categorizations are necessary
to achieve a beneficial societal goal—improved urban education.'"
The court found strong evidence to show that continued research
would lead to a greater understanding of the complex issues surround-
ing California's urban elementary school system even if defendants
could not guarantee improvement from the results of each individual
study. 123 The court recognized a significant state interest in maintain-
ing and improving the public education system.' 5° Furthermore, the
Hunter court recognized that no majority of the United States Supreme
Court has held explicitly that remedial action is the only valid compel-
ling state interest. 131 Finding a substantial nexus between UESts race-
based admissions policy and the school's goal of researching effective
urban education strategies and understanding the complex issues sur-
rounding California's urban elementary school system, the court held
diversity to be a compelling state interest in the UES elementary school
context. 132
In 1998, one year after Hunter, the Federal District Court for the
District of Maryland upheld a school district's consideration of race
when deciding whether to approve a student's voluntary transfer re-
quest among schools in Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools.'"
The Montgomery County Public Schools administered a number of
124 See id. at 1320.
125 See id, at 1320-21.
126 See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1321 n.8.
127 See id. at 1319. Plaintiff was identified as Asian-American (Japanese and Caucasian). See
id. at 1318.
'se
	 id. at 1327.
129 See id. at 1330.
I" See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1328.
131 See id. at 1325.
132 See id. at 1328-30.
133 See 19 F. Supp. 2d at 451,453-54. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of New
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magnet programs in various schools for, among other purposes, the
achievement of racial diversity in the schools.'" When deciding
whether to permit a transfer among its schools, the School Board
considered four factors: school stability, use/enrollment, diversity pro-
file, and the reason for the request.' 36
Based on his residence, plaintiff Jacob Eisenberg was scheduled
to attend Glen Haven Elementary School. 136 In March, 1998, Eisen-
berg, a white student, submitted a transfer request within the school
district to Rosemary Hills Elementary School and his transfer request
was denied. 137
 The only reason provided for the denial of his request
was "impact on diversity." The school district listed white students at
Glen Haven under the category "no transfers out, transfers in permit-
ted."'" Eisenberg brought suit against the Montgomery County Public
Schools claiming a violation of his constitutional rights and seeking
admission to Rosemary Hills Elementary School.'"
Finding diversity to be a compelling state interest in the public
elementary school context, the Eisenberg court relied on Justice Pow-
ell's diversity rationale in Bakke as well as the reasoning in Wessmann
/. 14° The court pointed out that although Justice Powell's diversity
rationale in Bakke was not joined by any other Justice, his view has not
been ignored, but in fact cited by other Justices in later United States
Supreme Court opinions. 141
 As in Wessmann I, the Eisenberg court also
declined to adopt the Hopwood decision and upheld the school dis-
York declined to follow Eisenberg in Brewer v. West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d
619, 635 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding school district's denial of student transfer from city to
suburban school on basis of race a violation of Equal Protection). Eisenbergis currently on appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See id. at 632 n.4. Oral arguments were
scheduled for June 1999.
im See Eisenberg 19 F. Supp. 2d at 451; see supra note 2 for a definition of "magnet schools."
135 See Eisenberg 19 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
136 See id.
13'7 see id.
I" See id. The racial composition of Glen Haven was 24.1% white, 40.5% African American,
25% Hispanic and 10.1% Asian compared to a county-wide enrollment of 53.4% white, 20.3%
African American, 13.2% Hispanic and 12.7% Asian. See id. The white enrollment at Glen Haven
dropped from 38.9% in 1994-95 to 24.1% in 1997-98. See Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
139 see id.
14° See id. at 453-54.
141 See id. at 453; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]n the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a school board may
reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty may be able to provide benefits to the student
body that could not be provided by a [non-diverse] faculty."); see also id. at 286 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently
'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial considera-
tions in furthering that interest"); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
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trict's consideration of race when deciding whether to approve a stu-
dent's voluntary transfer request between schools. 142
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Status of Bakke and the Diversity Rationale: Still Good Law?
Although the United States Supreme Court has never squarely
addressed the issue of diversity in the context of K-12 public educa-
tion, the Court has left room for holding that the achievement of
diversity is a compelling state interest.' 45 Indeed, no Supreme Court
decision has held that local school authorities may not consider race
in order to obtain a diverse student body in public schools. 144 Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke has been regarded as the cornerstone of
affirmative action in university admissions."' Since Bakke, the United
States Supreme Court has not squarely affirmed or rejected Justice
Powell's diversity rationale. 146
The fact that the United States Supreme Court has cited to Justice
Powell's diversity rationale in Bakke in subsequent decisions indicates
that this aspect of the Bakke decision is good law."7 The Wygant Court
left open the possibility of recognizing a compelling state interest in
the promotion of racial diversity.'" Justice Stevens suggested the im-
142 see Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 453-54.
I° See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson lid, of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
144 Since Bakke, there has been no other indication from the United States Supreme Court
as to whether a state interest in diversity constitutes a compelling justification for race-based
classifications used by public educational institutions. To date, the Supreme Court has not
reviewed the issue of diversity as a compelling state interest in the context of public R-12
education. Fearing possible damage to school desegregation efforts nationwide, the Boston
School Committee decided not to ask the United States Supreme Court to rule on the constitu-
tionality of the city's admissions policy, following the November, 1998, Wessmann v, Gittens
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160
F.3d 790, 800 (1st Cir. 1998). In particular, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and the U.S. Department of Education believed the case would lose before the
current U.S. Supreme Court, leaving school systems throughout the U.S. vulnerable to challenges
from those who disfavor race-based student assignment of any kind. See Beth Daley & Andy Dabilis,
In Switch, City Won't Appeal the Latin Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4, 1999, at Al,
145 See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity Justification, 29
TEX. UGH L REV. 1, 8 (1998).
146 See Hunter v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
147 The Metro Broadcasting Court relied on Justice Powell's diversity rationale in Baldte. See
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286.
148 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor suggested that
although the school board relied on an interest in providing African Americanteachers to serve
as role models for African-American students, that interest should not be confused with the very
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portance of diversity to the learning process of all students, including
white students, in the public school setting. 149 In his Wygant dissent,
Justice Stevens reasoned that one of the most important lessons Ameri-
can public schools teach is that diverse ethnic, cultural and national
backgrounds brought together in our famous "melting pot" do not
identify essential differences among human beings that inhabit our
land.'5° He further reasoned "Mt is one thing for a white child to be
taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only 'skin deep'; it
is far more convincing to experience that truth on a day-to-day basis
during the routine, ongoing learning process."'"
In addition to Wygant, the Metro Broadcasting Court relied on
Bakke's diversity rationale to sustain the FCC's use of racial preferenc-
ing programs. 152 Despite the fact that Adarand overruled Metro Broad-
casting, in their dissenting opinion in Adarand, Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg point out that the Metro Broadcasting holding does not fore-
close the prospect of recognizing diversity as a compelling state inter-
est.'" The Justices reasoned that the proposition that fostering diversity
may provide sufficient interest to justify such a program was not incon-
sistent with Adarand's holding; indeed, the question was not present
in the case. 154 Thus, the Adarand dissent emphasized that the majority's
opinion did not diminish the diversity aspect of the decision in Metro
Broadcasting.' 55 In addition to the Supreme Court, many lower courts
have cited to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as precedent on the
issue of diversity as a compelling interest in educational institutions.' 56
different goal of promoting racial diversity among the faculty. See id. at 288 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Because the school board has not relied on a diversity interest, Justice O'Connor
concluded it was not necessary to discuss the magnitude of that interest or its application in this
case. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149 See id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' 50 See id.
151
 litand, 476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 568.
155
 SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 257-58 (1995) (Stevens & Ginsburg,
B., dissenting).
154
 See id at 258.
155 see id
155 See Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968, 975-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (invoking Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke to hold that a university's obtaining benefits which flow from selecting a diverse
student body is a "compelling interest" under strict scrutiny); DeRonde v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 625 P.2d 220, 224-25 (Cal. 1981) (upholding a law school admissions policy that considered
"ethnic minority status" as an admissions factor in part on grounds that it passed federal consti-
tutional muster under the standards prescribed by Powell in Bakke); McDonald v. Hogness, 598
P.2d 707, 713 (Wash. 1979) (en bane) (invoking Bakke to find a medical school goal of promoting
student diversity to be "a compelling state interest permitting consideration of race" in admissions
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The Hopwood court's reasoning that Justice Powell's diversity ra-
tionale in Bakke is not binding precedent received a fair amount of
criticism from members of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals both
when it was decided and following denial of rehearing en banc.' 51
Judge Wiener of the Fifth Circuit stated that if Bakke is to be declared
dead, the Supreme Court, not a three-judge panel of a circuit court,
should make that pronouncement. 158 Conceding that only Justice Pow-
ell discussed diversity in Bakke, Wiener reasoned that although Bakke
left things unresolved, it should not be read as an order to throw out
Bakke, "bath, water, baby and all."
Seven judges on the Fifth Circuit reasoned that part V(C) of
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which endorsed the competitive
consideration • of race and ethnic origin in admissions decisions, had
the explicit support of four other Justices, thus making "the Supreme
Court's disposition precedential." 16° Thus, not only is Hopwood's treat-
ment of Bakke not binding outside the Fifth Circuit, but the court's
reasoning has also received much criticism within the Fifth Circuit. 161
Outside of the Fifth Circuit, the diversity rationale in Bakke is still good
law. 162 In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Wessmann H assumed Bakke was still good law and that some
"iterations" of diversity might be sufficiently compelling in specific
circumstances to justify race-conscious actions.' 63
process); see also supra notes 88-140 and accompanying text; Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in
Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 Haxv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REIT. 581, 442 n.41 (1998).
137 See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, CJ., King, Wiener,
Benavides, Stewart, Parker, Dennis, jj., dissenting from the failure to grant rehearing en banc);
78 F.3d 932, 963-65 (Wiener, j., specially concurring).
'58 See Bakke, 78 F.3d at 963.
159 1d. at 964 n.18. Justice Weiner noted that Bakke comprised multiple opinions and diver-
gent analyses and no justice, other than Justice Powell, discussed diversity. See id. at 963.
16° See Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 722-23. Politz, CJ., and King, Wiener, Benavides, Stewart, Parker
and Dennis, JJ., dissented from the Hopwood judgment to deny rehearing en bane. See id. The
seven judges also argued that lower federal courts are compelled to follow faithfully a directly
controlling Supreme Court precedent unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to
overrule it. See id. at 722.
161 See id.
1°2 See id. at 722-23.
163 See Wessmann II, 160 F.3d 790, 796-98 (1st Cir. 1998).
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B. The Croson and Adarand Decisions Are Not Binding Precedent in
the Education Context
Not only is the diversity rationale in Bakke still good law, but also
the Court did not foreclose the opportunity for the argument that
diversity is a compelling state interest in a public educational setting
in either Croson or Adarand. 164 In examining the line of case law
addressing the constitutionality of racial preferencing in the market-
place, no majority of the Supreme Court has held explicitly that reme-
dial action constitutes the only valid compelling state interest. 165
While concurring in the judgment in Croson, Justice Stevens wrote
separately to express the belief that remedial motivations are not the
only legitimate form of a compelling state interest which might justify
the use of racial preferencing. 166
 Justice Stevens reasoned that the
Court's approach would give unwarranted deference to race-based
legislative action that purports to serve a purely remedial goal and
would overlook the potential value of race-based determinations that
serve other purposes. 167
 Restating the language from his Wygant dissent
regarding the importance of diversity to the ongoing learning process
in public education, Justice Stevens seemed to suggest in Croson that
racial preferencing may have a place in the educational context. 168
Additionally, Justice Kennedy did not support whole-heartedly the view
that remedial measures are the only legitimate compelling state interest
in Croson. 169 Justice Kennedy reasoned that, because the rule of auto-
matic invalidity for racial preferences in almost every case would be a
significant break with precedents that require a case-by-case test, the
Court need not adopt such a rule of automatic invalidity at that
point.' 7°
In light of Justice Kennedy's endorsement of a case-by-case analysis
rather than a rule of "automatic invalidity," it is significant that the
facts of Croson are substantially different from those found in the
public education context. 171 While the impact of diversity may not be
164 See id.; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 n.1 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 258 (Stevens & Ginsburg, B., dissenting).
165 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 511 n1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
166 See id. (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I ... do not agree with the premise that seems to
underhe today's decision . . . that a governmental decision that rests on a racial classification is
never permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong.").
169
 See id. at 511 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
165 See id. at 512 n.2.
169 See id. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
117DSee Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
t'n see id
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compelling in the marketplace context of government contracting,
diversity of students in an educational setting can have a profound
impact on student learning and development.'"In addition, the Croson
Court's apprehension that racial classifications may lead to stigmatic
harm, notions of racial inferiority and racial hostility is specific to the
context of government contracting; in contracting, there is natural
animosity and competition, since one enterprise will be awarded a bid
over others.'" Certainly this type of hostility or animosity may be
present in student competition for admission to a prestigious exam
school. The education context, however, is distinct from the market-
place setting, as the District Court in Wessmann I recognized, because
teachers and students may address and resolve cultural conflicts in an
educational setting so that students learn to appreciate differences. 174
Pedagogical theory and research stands in sharp contrast to the
notion that racial preferencing may promote racial hostility and stig-
matic harm in the classroom.'" In the unique education context, racial
stereotypes may be dispelled through student discussion and interac-
tion.'" Students have the opportunity to discover and appreciate the
specific kind of knowledge and experience that an African-American
student might bring to the classroom, and feelings of hostility are
diffused more easily.'" Recent studies further support this argument,
02 See id.
"3 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
174 See Wessmann I, 996 F. Supp. at 128, 130. The U.S. District Court in Wessmann I distin-
guished the educational context from that of Croson and Adarand, which dealt with regulations
awarding municipal and federal construction contracts, reasoning that more than any other
institution, public schools awaken children to cultural values and practices of civility that lead to
tolerance and understanding of divergent political, religious and social convictions. See id. Thus,
the Wessmann I court reasoned it was not bound by the Croson and Adarand decisions. See id. at
130.
175 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 145, 44-45.
To suggest that the diversity justification is based on an assumption that a person's
race controls point of view is an overstatement . . . The fact that a person's race,
like economic, geographic, or employment background, will lead to experiences
that will occasionally provide a different perspective on the discussion of issues is
enough .... [A] black person may offer a distinct perspective on the treatment of
blacks by police . . . based not on a stereotypical black point of view but rather on
personal experience . . . . Moreover, a person's perspective is based, not on some
overreaching stereotype but rather on the individual's unique life experiences ....
Plocusing on the distinct perspectives a black person may offer would be more
consistent with the individualistic approach to equal protection the Court favors.
Id.
176 Seejatie Ward Schofield, Review of Research an School Desegregation's Impact on Elementary
and Secondary School Students, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTI-CULTURAL EDUCATION 597,
605, 607-10 James Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks, eds., 1995).
I77 See id.
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indicating that white students who have increased contact with African-
American and Mexican-American peers in desegregated schools de-
velop a more positive attitude towards members of these groups.' 78 A
recent Boston Globe article described how, after spending a night at
each others' homes, a METCO student from Boston and a student
from the Lincoln-Sudbury area found they shared "common ground":
both girls considered being doctors, both received early acceptances
to college and both were trying to decide whom to ask to the prom.''
The desegregation program further functions to dispel suburban stu-
dents' incorrect notions regarding life in the city. One Sudbury student
related: u[y]ou have to go back and tell them that [the danger of being
shot] is just not true. The city is a safe place; my family is like your
family. "180
Thus, the Court's concern in Croson that racial classifications may
in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to racial hostility
are not applicable in the educational setting in which teachers and
educational programming can foster students' understanding and ap-
preciation of cultural differences. 18' In fact, educators have found that
while in the past schools played a central role in perpetuating institu-
tional racism, schools can play an equal role in combating racism.' 82
For example, studies have found that the presence of significant num-
bers of children of color hastens the implementation of processes that
bring issues and assumptions to the surface, creating a forum to ad-
dress and dissect stereotypes and tension.' 83 Thus, by breaking cycles
of racial hostility and segregation, classroom desegregation has proven
178 See id. at 608-09.
09 See Doreen tudica Vigue, Metco Role Reversal is a Real Eye-Opener, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
21, 1999, at Al. For a definition of METCO, see supra note 1. The article describes a program
in which seven METCO students at Lincoln-Sudbury High School invited six classmates and five
teachers to spend five days and four nights in their Boston homes. See id.
le* See id. at A26. In addition, the Boston Globe recently featured an article which described
the friendship between a Lynnfield High School student, Adam Polansky, and Harold Roy, a
METCO student from East Boston; Roy occasionally stays with the Polansky family overnight and
on weekends. The friends say they've become "brothers"—brought together by a program that
they claim ended their biases and created a lasting friendship. See Doreen Indica Vigue, Lynnfteld
Students Unite to Back Metco, BosTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1999, at A13.
181
 See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
182 See Kathy Greeley & Linda Mizell, One Step Among Many: Affirming Identity in Anti-Racist
Schools, in FOSTERING MULTICULTERAL EDUCATION 215.
I" See id. at 216-17. For example, at Graham and Parks Alternative K-8 Public School in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 51% of the students are students of color and 49% are white (a third
are Haitian). See id. at 217. The school is committed to multi-cultural education and has seen
little overt racism and few fights, with even fewer fights motivated by race. See id.
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to have positive effects in stark contrast to the Court's concern in
Croson.'"
As in Croson, the marketplace context of Adarand would not lend
itself readily to the benefits of diversity in the same way as an educa-
tional setting.' 85 While the Court in Adarand reasoned that even a
well-intentioned preference may exacerbate racial prejudice, this phe-
nomena would be far more likely in the competitive context of a
government's awarding highway contracts than it would be in an edu-
cational setting in which teachers worked to dispel notions of prejudice
and foster a community of tolerance and appreciation for students'
differences.'" Pedagogical research further supports this proposition:
short-term educational benefits of a desegregated high school experi-
ence include improvement in race relations and gains on achievement
tests and level of educational attainment (for minority students). 187
Long-term benefits for all students include a significantly enhanced
likelihood of working in a desegregated environment.'" Thus, because
of significant contextual distinctions, it is questionable whether the line
of United States Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality
of racial preferencing in the marketplace binds the lower courts on
the issue of racial preferencing in the education context.'"
C. Proving the Empirical Value of Diversity in the Education Context:
"The Devil Is in the Details"
Recognizing that Bakke remains good law and some iterations of
diversity may be sufficiently compelling in the education context, Wess-
mann II indicates that a public school's racial preferencing program
might survive strict scrutiny upon a finding of concrete, specific evi-
dence that indicates a substantial nexus between the stated educational
goals and the school's admissions policy.'" The current judicial trend
' 84 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
185 See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S 200, 228-29 (1995).
in See id.
187 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 605.
188
 See id.
189 See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 512 n.2 (Stevens, J. concurring); Adarand, 458 U.S. at 228-29.
Despite the fact that the Hopwood court faced the issue of racial preferencing in the educational
context, the court relied on affirmative action case law in the marketplace context (Croson,
Metro-Broadcasting and Adarand) to reach its holding that diversity is not a compelling interest
to justify racial preferencing in the educational context. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945
(5th Cir. 1996). The court's reliance on this line of case law is misplaced. See id.
18° See Wessmann II, 160 F.3d at 796-800. Although the "narrow tailoring" prong of the strict
scrutiny review is beyond the scope of this Note, the First Circuit made clear in Wessmann II that
the Boston School Committee's particular admissions program must be narrowly tailored in order
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seems to favor the "nexus" analysis as applied by the court in Hunter;
a recent U.S. District Court decision which relied on finding a substan-
tial nexus between the educational goal—a compelling state interest—
and the school admissions policy. 191 Similar to the Hunter court's ap-
proach, the First Circuit in Wessmann II suggested that the value of
diversity must be shown concretely and specifically, noting that it is too
abstract to say that diversity "nourishes the intellect" or "furthers mu-
tual understanding and respect." 192 To persuade the court that diversity
may be compelling, the court in Wessmann II reasoned, school officials
must give "substance to the word . . . [o]nly by such particularized
attention can we ascertain whether the Policy bears any necessary
relation to the noble ends it espouses. In short, the devil is in the
to survive strict scrutiny. See id. at 797-99, 800. The First Circuit struck down the admissions policy
in Wessmann II in part because the policy was not modeled in the spirit ofJustice Powell's diversity
rationale in Bakke. See id. In Bakke, Justice Powell describes the Harvard admissions policy as an
example of a plan that might meet the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny review. See Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-19, 323 (1978). Some speculate whether the Boston
School Committee's admissions policy would have survived if the policy had simply stated it
considered the applicants' exam score and "other factors"—without explicitly mentioning racial
or ethnic preferencing. See Wessmann II, 160 F.3d at 797-99, 800.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that there is no other legitimate means of achieving
racial/ethnic diversity without considering race in the admissions/transfer process. See Geoffrey
Fowler, Alternative Action, DIVERSITY & DISTINCTION Mao., Nov. 1998, at 19. Professor William
Julius Wilson, a scholar on the dynamics of race and class, believes that class-based affirmative
action programs cannot be a substitute for race-based affirmative action programs if the goal is
to maintain the kind of diversity that is currently in place, especially among African Americans
and Latino/as. See id. The most recent research indicates that class-based affirmative action
programs would primarily benefit low-income white and Asian Americans, resulting in a small
number of low income African Americans and Latinos attending college, while excluding many
middle class African Americans. See id. According to Wilson, this occurs because standardized
tests often are not sensitive to what Wilson calls "the cumulative experience of race": effects of
living in a segregated neighborhood, attending disadvantaged schools and other forms of cultural
experience. See id. Thus, policies which consider only socio-economic class often end up accept-
ing low-income white students and do not achieve the kind of racial and ethnic diversity that
most schools desire to create. See id. For additional arguments in support of the use of race as a
factor in admissions policies, see Akhil Reed Amar and Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1745, 1772-73 (1996); Frederick A. Morton, Jr., Class-Based Affirmative Action:
Another Illustration of America Denying The Impact of Race, 45 arrGERs L. REV. 1089 (1991);
Robert Kuttner, From Equal Opportunity to Equal Indifference, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 1999, at
07; but see Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-based Affirmative Arnim, BOSTON Gunn, Jan. 19, 1999,
at All.
191 See Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1327-30 (C.D. Cal.
1997). Goodwill Liu reads Bakke, 149gant and Croson to suggest that the "compelling interest test"
is actually two tests in one: (1) whether the government interest is sufficient as a substantive
matter and (2) whether the government actor has produced sufficient evidence to substantiate
its alleged interest. See Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Ration-
ale and the Compelling Interest Test. 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 401 (1998).
192 See Wessmann g 160 F.3d at 796-98.
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details."'" While in Hunter the school's goal was to research urban
educational strategies, other educational goals such as fostering anti-
racist education, increasing student achievement over the long-term
and breaking the cycle of racial segregation are likewise compelling.
Recent longitudinal research indicates a strong nexus between a di-
verse, desegregated classroom and the achievement of goals such as
breaking the cycle of racial segregation in workplaces and neighbor-
hoods, promoting positive intergroup relations, and increasing student
achievement over the short term and the long term.'"
1. The Beneficial Long-Term Effects of Students' Exposure to
Diversity in Public Schools
A substantial body of recent research indicates that a desegregated
K-12 education has concrete, beneficial effects over the long term for
students of all races and ethnicities. 195 The findings from numerous
studies indicate that diverse, desegregated schools often serve as vehi-
cles for breaking the cycle of racial segregation later in life.' 96 Amy
Stuart Wells and Robert L. Crain assembled findings from twenty-
one of the most substantial studies of the long-term effects of school
desegregation.' 97 Due to the ambiguous findings of the research on
short-term effects of school desegregation, Wells and Crain believe
researchers and policymakers should look beyond short-term effects
and focus more on long-term social and economic outcomes. 198 Ac-
cording to Wells and Crain, school desegregation should do more than
193 See a; The First Circuit decision, requiring "details" and "concrete evidence," is similar
to the reasoning in O'Connor's opinion in Croson, that rejected racial preferencing policies which
are "amorphous and over-expansive," such as remedying general societal discrimination. See id;
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469,507-08 (1989).
194 See infra notes 193-256 and accompanying text.
X 95 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 605. Desegregation may have long-term social and
economic consequences for minorities by {1) providing access to useful social networks of job
information, contacts and sponsorship; (2) promoting socialization for aspirations and entrance
into non-traditional career lines with higher income returns; (3) developing of interpersonal skills
useful in interracial contexts; (4) reducing social inertia-increased tolerance and willingness to
participate in desegregated environments; and (5) avoiding negative attributions often associated
with African-American institutions. See id.
196 See Amy Stuart Wells and Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Longterm Effects of
School Desegregation, 64 REV. or Enuc. RES. 531,532 (1994).
197 See Id. Much of the research was published from the mid-1980s to 1990s as the long-term
effects of desegregation plans implemented in the late 1960s and 1970s became more apparent.
See id.
198 See id. at 532-33. Short-term effects include achievement test scores, intergroup relations
and self-esteem of black students. See id.
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just raise test scores—it must break the cycle of racial segregation that
leaves whites and African Americans worlds apart.'"'
Wells and Crain have described the cycle of racial segregation as
the "perpetuation theory," the concept that segregation tends to repeat
itself across stages of the life cycle and institutions when individuals
have not had sustained experiences in desegregated settings earlier in
life." Wells and Crain found that minority students who have not
experienced the realities of desegregation regularly may overestimate
the degree of overt hostility they will encounter or underestimate their
skill at coping with strains in interracial situations." These segregated
students will most likely make choices that maintain their physical
segregation when they become adults because they have never tested
their racial beliefs."'
There is evidence that African Americans who attended desegre-
gated schools are more likely to report living in integrated neighbor-
hoods and having white social contacts later in life 2 05 A 1990 study
found a positive relation between years of desegregated schooling and
acceptance of residential integration for white high school seniors."'
There is a documented tendency for all students who attend desegre-
gated schools to be much more likely to settle in interracial neighbor-
hoods." In sum, many studies indicate that students who have expe-
rienced desegregated schooling are more likely to continue to choose
desegregated contexts, both in school and in other spheres of their
lives.'"
In addition to breaking cycles of racial segregation, the desegre-
gated school experience develops students' ability to work effectively
I99 See Wells and Crain, supra note 196, at 533.
200 See id. Perpetuation theory focuses on how individuals adjust their behavior to accommo•
date and thus perpetuate constraints to racial integration and how exposure to integrated settings
can change this behavior. See id.
201 See id. at 533.
202 See id.
292 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 610.
294 See id.
205 See GARY ORFIELD Er AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 106 (1996).
296 See William T. Trent, Outcomes of School Desegregation: Findings from Longitudinal Research,
66 J. NEGRO EDUC. 255, 257 (1997); Schofield, supra note 176, at 610. Trent's findings were
derived from the National Survey of 1980 High School Sophomores and Seniors, known as High
School and Beyond ("HS&B"), a national probability sampling of over 58,000 individuals who
were high school seniors and sophomores in 1980; the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
Labor Force Participation, a survey of 12,686 young persons throughout the U.S. sponsored by
the U.S. Departments of Labor and Defense from 1979-85; and the National Longitudinal Survey
of the High School Class of 1972—Employer Survey, a probability sample of 4,078 employers of
young adult workers who participated in the earlier longitudinal study. See Trent, supra, at 255.
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in the context of cultural diversity. Current population trends make
the acquisition of this skill an increasingly compelling aspect of chil-
dren's education. 207
In their 1984 paper, Jomills Henry Braddock II, Robert L. Crain
and James M. McPartland summarize the results of several national
surveys and conclude that African Americans, Latino/as and white
students who attended desegregated schools are more likely to work
in racially-mixed workplaces than their peers who attended segregated
schools.208 Additional support for this conclusion comes from Dr. Wil-
liam Trent's 1991 examination of data from the 1979 cohort of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Force Behavior Youth Survey. 2°9
Trent found that desegregated schooling may not only affect one's
propensity to work in racially mixed settings, but also one's reaction to
the experience. 214 Specifically, Trent concluded that African-American,
Latino/a, and white graduates of segregated schools perceive racially-
mixed work groups as less friendly than racially-homogeneous ones,
while respondents from desegregated schools make much less of a
distinction.211 This suggests, Trent concluded, that a desegregated
school experience can have far-reaching effects in a number of differ-
ent contexts. 212 For example, in the employment arena, a desegregated
school experience can reduce negative feelings toward co-workers of
other ethnic groups. 213
A study conducted by Braddock and McPartland further suggests
that high school desegregation appears to promote more positive per-
ceptions and social contacts among African Americans and whites
in racially heterogeneous work groups. 214 Braddock and McPartland
found that earlier experiences of African Americans in desegregated
settings, such as those in schools, help to break down social barriers
by creating more accurate and positive expectations of white reactions,
by building confidence in one's ability to succeed in racially-mixed
environments and by providing practice to deal with the strains caused
2°7 See Schofield, supra note 174, at 608. This skill has also been recognized as one of the
basic competencies required to perform effectively in the U.S. labor force. See id.
208 See jomills Henry Braddock II & James M. McPartland, Social Psychological Processes that
Perpetuate Racial Segregation: The Relationship Between School and Employment Desegregation, 19 J.
BLACK STUD. 267, 285-86 (1989).
"9 See Trent, supra note 206, at 257.
212 See id.
211 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 610.
212 See id.
212 See id.
214 Set Braddock and McPartland, supra note 208, at 284.
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by cross-racial contacts. 25 Because of this early experience in a deseg-
regated setting, one would expect less avoidance or withdrawal from
desegregated experiences later in life. 216 Thus, if cross-racial relation-
ships in desegregated schools reduce white students' negative racial
stereotypes and fears of hostile reactions in interracial situations, then
these white students will be less resistant to admitting African Ameri-
cans into co-worker friendship groups as adults. 217
Regarding the long-term impact of desegregation on white stu-
dents, two studies demonstrated that the racial composition of stu-
dents' high school or college influences the likelihood that they will
work in a desegregated setting later in life. 218 This finding may stem
from the fact that whites in desegregated schools frequently show a
decrease in their often initially high levels of fear and avoidance of
African Americans, and an increasing willingness and ability to work
with African Americans. 219 With regard to African Americans in pre-
dominantly white work settings, the higher the percentage of white
students in their high schools, the more they considered their white
co-workers to be friendly.220
In addition to positive occupational outcomes, a substantial body
of research suggests that desegregation tends to lead to more positive
intergroup attitudes.22' Because of the pervasive residential segregation
in our society, students often have their first relatively extended inter-
racial experiences in schoo1. 222 The growth or decrease of hostility and
stereotyping may be influenced particularly by circumstances occur-
ring at school; whether schools consciously try to influence intergroup
relations, schools are extremely likely to do so in one way or another.225
Studies have found that social barriers to interracial contact
among white adults may be broken down by experiences in cross-racial
situations earlier in life. 224 Research suggests that white students who
have increased contact with African-American and Mexican American
peers in desegregated schools develop more positive attitudes towards
213 See id. at 284-85.
216 see id.
217 see iiri.
212 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 610.
us see id.
220 see a
221 See id. at 608-10.
222 Set, id. at 608. This assumes the school is racially integrated—an often untrue assumption
to make of suburban schools.
223 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 608.
224 See id. at 610.
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members of these groups. 228 A National Opinion Research Center
Survey in 1979 found that white students in desegregated school situ-
ations were more likely to report having a close African-American
friend and having had African-American friends visit their homes. 226
Furthermore, a wide body of research suggests that desegregated
classrooms have a positive impact on the academic achievement of
students of all races and ethnicities. 227 Robert L. Crain, a desegregation
expert at Columbia University, describes student achievement gains
as a result of desegregation to be significant. 228 In a study with Rita
Mahard, Crain found that desegregation that started at the beginning
of elementary school and lasted throughout the school years had the
greatest benefits in terms of student achievement, as did access of
minority students to suburban schools. 228 Jane Schofield conducted the
most recent major summary of research literature, finding that there
were significant but relatively modest test score gains, especially in
reading and English, for students from desegregated classrooms."°
Fifty-two social scientists attested to findings that desegregation is
generally associated with significant gains in the achievement of Afri-
can-American students in an amicus brief submitted to the United
States Supreme Court in 1992. 23 ' Similarly, Susan Eaton and Christina
Meldrum examined student performance on the Iowa Test of Basic
Skills between 1989 and 1993. 232 They found that performance gaps
between African-American students in segregated schools and those in
better-integrated schools had become wider.283 Gaps between African-
American third graders in segregated schools and those in better-
integrated schools increased from four points in 1990 to ten points in
1993. By grade four, the gaps increased from one point in 1989 to
twelve points in 1993. 284 Further, scores for African-American students
in integrated schools, although still below the national average, have




227 See id. at 605-06.
228 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 610.
229 See id. at 605.
I" See id. at 610-11.
231 See Brief of the NAACP, Dega113 COM tty, Georgia, Branch of NAACP et al., as Amid Curiae
in Support of Respondents app. at 7a, 8a, Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (No. 89-1290);
Bradley W. Joondeph, Skepticism and School Desegregation, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 161,162 (1998).
232 See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 205, at 132.
255 See id.
"4 See id.
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segregated schools have declined. 255 Results from basic literacy tests
reveal a sizable gap between the percentage of students passing in
segregated schools and that of students in integrated schools. 256 In all
subjects at every grade level, all students in segregated schools scored
far worse, on average, on state-required tests, than their counterparts
in integrated schools. 257
 Thus, based on their findings, the researchers
concluded that desegregated schools have a positive impact on stu-
dents' academic achievement. 238
In an effort to determine the effects of school desegregation in
St. Louis under a 1984 consent decree, William Trent examined the
graduation rates of African-American students who had transferred to
desegregated county (suburban) schools or who were enrolled in the
city's desegregated magnet schools as compared to the graduation rate
of African-American students in segregated city schools. 252 Trent con-
cluded that although many African-American students in desegregated
schools were poor, their graduation rate far exceeded those of students
in segregated schools. 24° Gary Orfield, an expert in school desegrega-
tion research, also studied the effects of school desegregation in St.
Louis following the 1984 consent decree. 24 ' Orfield found that pro-
grams like the interdistrict transfer program in St. Louis, can lead to
positive results for disadvantaged students by affording them access to
"practical know-how," contacts and counseling that can help students
become more aware of opportunities about which they might not
otherwise learn. 242
Orfield's findings form part of the most coherent body of evi-
dence supporting school desegregation, which rests on an entirely
different way of defining the achievement gains resulting from deseg-
regation: desegregation may alter the life chances for minority students
by allowing them entrance into an opportunity system more likely to
lead to success in American society. 243 In work dating back to the late
1970s, a group of researchers at Johns Hopkins University including
235 See id.
236 See Id. at 133.
237 See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 205, at 133.
238
 See id. at 132-33.
239 See William L. Taylor, The Role of Social Science in School Desegregation Efforts, 66 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 196, 198-99 (1997).
240 See id. at 199.
2" See id. at 201.
242 See id. Under the St. Louis consent decree, the city operated the largest li]nterdistrict
transfer program" in the nation, under which 13,000 African-American students in the city were
enrolled in desegregated schools in 16 districts in St. Louis County. See id. at 198.
243 See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 205, at 103-06.
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Braddock, McPartland and Grain concluded that test scores were an
inadequate measure of the benefits of desegregation. 244 The real goal
of desegregation for minority students, they concluded, was to change
their life chances by moving them into an opportunity system more
likely to lead to success in American society. 245 Segregation meant
isolation from mainstream opportunities for African Americans—"a
life-long, self-perpetuating process with intergenerational effects that
institutionalize inequality." 246 Integration was a means of breaking out
of this isolation into a full range of middle class opportunities affecting
higher education, employment and choice of community in which to
live and raise children. 247 Because there was ample evidence that test
scores and grades in school do not explain much of the variance in
later income or status, it became very important to study the effects
directly.248
As Orfield declined to focus solely on test scores and grades as
indicators of academic achievement, Wells and Crain also analyzed
twenty-one studies which produced abundant evidence supporting the
view that desegregation connects students to a network tied to greater
life-long opportunity."' "Network analysis," a theory developed by Wells
and Crain, is the structural argument that segregation is perpetuated
across generations because African Americans and Latino/as lack ac-
cess to informal networks that provide information about, and en-
trance to, desegregated institutions and employment. 250 Less formal
interpersonal networks, such as acquaintances or friends of friends,
have a strong impact on the diffusion of influence, mobility opportu-
nities and information. 261 The knowledge students need concerning
association between education and occupational attainment is usually
transmitted through the interaction of students, school personnel and
certain persons outside the school system, especially parents, and it is
more prevalent within environments linked to the dominant white
community (i.e. the predominantly white school).252 School desegrega-
tion helps to break the cycle of segregation by alleviating one of the
mechanisms that perpetuates racial isolation: African Americans' lack




248 See ORPIELD ET AL., supra note 205, at 105-06.
2" See id. at 106.
25° See Wells and Crain, supra note 196, at 533.
251 See id.
252 See id. at 538.
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of information concerning educational opportunities and methods of
attaining specific goals. 255
Furthermore, the findings indicate that desegregated African-
American students set their occupational aspirations higher than do
segregated African American students?" In addition, desegregated Af-
rican-American students' occupational aspirations are more realisti-
cally related to their educational aspirations and attainment than those
of segregated African-American students. 255 There was also marked
difference in college success among students who graduated from
desegregated schools. 256
William Trent found that desegregated schooling also has impor-
tant long-term benefits for minority students, especially in terms of its
ability to open up economic opportunities for them. 2" Parents who
attended desegregated schools are more likely to have attended col-
lege, have better jobs, and live in desegregated neighborhoods. 255
2. Criticism of School Desegregation
Opponents of school desegregation have questioned the value of
desegregation, contending it has increased the rate of "white flight"
from urban school districts and undermined efforts to improve the
quality of education in predominantly African-American schools. 255
Christine Rossell, a professor of political science at Boston University,
asserts that desegregation often leads to white flight. 260 Virtually all
research on school desegregation and white flight indicates that school
25S See id.
254 See id. at 540.
255 See Wells and Crain, supra note 196, at 540.
256 See ORETELD ET AL., supra note 205, at 106.
257 See Trent, supra note 206, at 257.
252 See id.
259 See joondeph, supra note 231, at 161. The term "white flight" was used originally to
characterize the phenomenon of middle-class, white suburbanization that has occurred since the
1950s. The white flight trend is a function of "pull" factors such as greater space, greenery,
lower-cost family housing, low tax rates and changes in production and transportation in the
suburbs, and "push" factors such as central city crime. See Christine H. Rossell and Willis D.
Hawley, Understanding White Flight and Doing Something About It, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DE-SEG-
REGATION 157-58 (Willis D. Hawley, ed. 1981).
26° See Christine H. Rossell, An Analysis of the Court Decisions in Sheff v. 07Veill and Possible
Remedies for Racial Isolation, 29 Court. L. REV. 1187,1210-17 (1997). Rossell bases her theory on
white flight in part on surveys conducted by the Attorney General's Office of Connecticut in 1991
and 1992 that indicated 51% of white parents in Hartford would withdraw their child from public
school if their child were reassigned to a formerly minority school. The estimated actual white
no-show rate is only 45% because it is adjusted downward by a six-point difference between survey
no-show rate and actual no-show rate resulting from a similar survey in Los Angeles. See id.
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desegregation significantly accelerates white flight in most school dis-
tricts in the year of implementation if the desegregation plan involves
mandatory school reassignments. 261 Rossell and Hawley found that the
busing of whites to formerly African-American schools accelerated
white flight more than "one-way busing," and white flight was greater
in districts with more than thirty-five percent minority students. 262 Yet
research concerning long-term annual changes in white enrollment
found no long-term negative effect in most districts; that is, short-term
implementation losses of white students appeared to be compensated
for by less than normal post-implementation losses of white students. 263
Rossell and Hawley further recognize that there are a number of
initiatives that could be taken by government to reduce the exodus of
white and middle-class students from public schools. 264
Rossell recognizes that the term "white flight" has been used most
recently and erroneously to describe the decline in central-city white
public school enrollment and that desegregation does not always or
inevitably lead to long-term changes in the racial composition of com-
triunities. 265 Most research demonstrates that "white flight" is largely
unrelated to school desegregation; the trend of white migration from
cities to suburbs began in the 1940s, well before the implementation
of school desegregation. 266 In addition, studies reveal that the declining
percentage of whites in city school districts is the product of declining
white birth rates and white out-migration attributable primarily to
increasing crime rates and fears related to an increasing percentage of
minority residents. 267 Gary Orfield states that one of the biggest prob-
lems with "white flight" evidence currently being used in courts is that
261 See Rossell and Hawley, supra note 259, at 165. In 1978-79, racial tolerance was found to
have progressed so that African-American reassignments into white schools did not increase white
flight from the receiving school district significantly. See id. at 166. In addition, Rossell and Hawley
note that minimizing busing distances will probably reduce implementation-year white flight in
those districts where flight is likely to be greatest. See id. at 173.
262 See id. at 169. "One-way busing" was a term used to describe African American reassign-
ments to white schools. See id. at 166.
263 See Rossell and Hawley, supra note 259, at 170. This research used cross-sectional multiple
regression to analyze annual post-implementation changes in white enrollment. See id. The
problem with these analyses is that they average effects across school districts. See id. Rossell found
that big city school districts with minority white school populations were the least likely to make
up implementation-year losses by less than normal post-implementation losses. See id.
26.1 See id. at 182. Such initiatives may include voluntary plans, mandatory plans with a
voluntary magnet school component, implementation timing, busing distance minimization,
subdistricting, providing incentives for housing desegregation and public information. See id. at
171-74.
263 See Rossell and Hawley, supra note 259, at 158, 182.
266 See joondeph, supra note 257, at 163; °Inge/A) rt. Al.., supra note 205, at 315-17.
261 See0ftelEtn ET AL., supra note 205, at 315-17. School desegregation was not the sole cause
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most evidence is drawn from experience with the type of desegregation
plans, such as pure mandatory reassignment plans, that have not been
ordered for fifteen years. 266 In contrast, recent plans tend to provide
new educational options, and choice is a major component. 269
Another effect of school desegregation is the movement toward
neighborhood and Afro-centric schools. 27° In school districts which
have operated under mandatory desegregation plans for years, the
sentiment of some African-American parents has shifted considerably
in recent years from supporting integration efforts to asserting a pref-
erence to return to neighborhood schools and Afro-centric schools."'
The rise of Afro-centric schools and voluntary self-segregation began
when African Americans began rethinking the "unfulfilled promise of
integration" and turned inward to pursue a self-imposed "resegrega-
tion" designed to foster self-help and "black pride." 272 Many African-
American parents assert that traditional public schools often leave their
children lacking in pride and self-esteern. 29 Afro-centric schools are
lauded for fostering a communal feel and promoting cultural sol-
vency.274 Angela Paige Cook, founder of the privately-run, predomi-
nantly African American Paige Academy in Roxbury, Massachusetts,
states that segregated schools may be rich in certain ways, such as
providing positive role models for kids within the community. 275 Rev-
erend Raymond Hammond, president of the Ten-Point Coalition, an
organization of Boston ministers, pointed out that while no African-
American leader favors a return to legally-mandated separate-but-equal
status, he favors black nationalism and believes a community works best
economically, educationally and socially if it stays together.276 Even
of white enrollment decline, yet most agree that some desegregation plans, such as plans man-
dating busing many white students into central cities with high minority populations, accelerate
the decline of white enrollment. See id. at 316.
2"See id. at 317.
299 See id.
2" See Joondeph, supra note 231, at 161-62; John Yemma, The New Segregation Black Com-
munity Reexamining School Busing, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 15,1997, at Al; Wil Haygood, On Schools,
Many Blacks Return to Roots, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16,1997, at Al.
271 See Haygood, supra note 270, at Al. Afrocentric schools are African-centered secondary
schools. Courts have held that public schools can be African-centered as long as they are open
to all students. See id. In 1997, there were about 400 African-centered schools in the United States
and from (992-97, the number of African-centered schools increased by 30%. See id. In Detroit,
12 of the public schools are now African-centered; they are located in virtually all-black neigh-
borhoods. See id.
272 See id.
273 See Haygood, supra note 270, at Al.
274 See id.
t" See Yernma, supra note 270, at Al.
276 See id.
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staunch integrationists such as Hubie Jones, of the University of Mas-
sachusetts, believe "some separation is essential" to allow people to
"psychologically and spiritually regroup."277
A third criticism of school desegregation has been directed at the
problems resulting from students being bused to locations far from
their homes. 278 Many opponents of busing prefer neighborhood
schools not for the sake of attending schools with people of the same
race, but because they believe it is more comfortable to attend school
with people one is "used to being around."27s John Henderson, presi-
dent of the Tulsa, Oklahoma branch of the NAACP, criticized busing,
stating: "[0] ur kids were bused to schools and teachers who didn't care
about them. The kids were treated like cattle."280 Others blame busing
for a "brain drain" that harmed black neighborhoods. 28i
Yet because of the stark racial inequalities that remain and the
empirical research revealing desegregation's potential, many commen-
tators have called the Court's abandonment of desegregation prema-
ture, unwarranted and unjust. 282 Derrick Z. Jackson refuted arguments
made against desegregative busing in his January, 1999, Boston Globe
op-ed piece, writing about his childhood experience with METCO
busing to attend suburban schools:
It was about exposure and confidence. I was friends with sons
of furriers as well as factory workers. I had white and black
bowling partners . . . The interracial friendships taught me
about individual humanity in a racist country . . . . Busing is
not ideal. But until society treat[s] [sic] schools equally, it has
no right to vilify it or any other way black parents secure a
27 7 See id.
278 See id. For example, many of Boston's METCO students must wake up at 5:15 a.m. to
embark on a one-hour bus ride to their assigned suburban school. See Vigue, supra note 179, at
A26.
279 See Yemma, supra note 270, at Al.
28° Id.
281 See Jackson, supra note 1, at A19.
282 See Joondeph, supra note 231, at 166. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
manifested an intent to end an era of court-enforced desegregation. See generally Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that a federal court could not order salary increases and
remedial education programs, despite the fact that student achievement in the Kansas City school
district was still at or below the national norm at many grade levels, because these programs were
too far removed from the goal of eliminating racial segregation); Freeman v. Fitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992) (upholding the District Court's finding that racial imbalance in DeKalb County schools
was a function of demographic changes and not a vestige of a prior dual system and finding
partial dismissal of desegregation decree appropriate); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237
(1991) (remanding the case to determine whether school should be released from desegregation
order because of good faith compliance with desegregation plan).
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good school. Until quality education comes back to the black
neighborhood, it makes the critics rather transparent. They
hate busing so because they know those yellow buses, those
great, glowing chariots, put a lot of black children like me on
the road to a golden life. 288
Thus, despite the criticism it has received, school desegregation
most often has been praised for the numerous documented bene-
ficial effects it has on the education and development of all stu-
den ts. 284
3. Public Opinion Supports Integrated Classrooms
American public opinion favors desegregated public classrooms
and seems to recognize the beneficial effects of an integrated school
environment on student development and achievement. 285 In a 1994
National Gallup Poll, sixty-five percent of the general public and sev-
enty percent of African Americans found that integration improved
the quality of education for African Americans and forty-two percent
of all Americans believed integration improved the quality of educa-
tion for whites. 286 A 1993 Connecticut poll indicated that sixty-three
percent of Connecticut voters believed that children who go to one-
race schools will be at a disadvantage when they grow up and must
confront the multicultural society in which they work and live. 287 A
recent Boston Globe poll found that sixty-two percent of African Ameri-
cans and forty-nine percent of whites felt that, in light of the nation-
wide trend toward returning to neighborhood schools, it was bad for
schools to be made up of people of the same race. 288 Seventy-six percent
of African Americans and seventy-three percent of whites answered
that "full integration" would be better for race relations in Arnerica. 288
283jackson, supra note 1.
284 See supra notes 193-256 and accompanying text.
285 See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 205, at 108.
288 See id.
"7 See it
288 See Globe Poll, Views an Race in America (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.bos-
ton.corn/globe/nation/packa....nldng_integration/vies_on_race_poll.html >.
289 See id.
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4. The United States Department of Education Recognizes Diversity
as a Compelling State Interest
Perhaps in recognition of the strong public opinion in support of
school desegregation, the United States Department of Education re-
cently reaffirmed that public school districts not under desegregation
orders nonetheless may have a compelling interest in promoting di-
verse student bodies. 290 The Magnet School Assistance Program, admin-
istered by the Department of Education, which Congress designated
to address the elimination, reduction or prevention of minority group
isolation in elementary and secondary schools, makes funds available
to school districts implementing voluntary plans to promote diverse
student enrollments as well as those under desegregation orders. 29' The
statute states that the Department should fund schools that are "de-
signed to bring students from different social, economic, ethnic, and
racial backgrounds together." 292 In its Magnet Schools Assistance Pro-
gram Notice for Fiscal Year 1998, the Department affirmed that the
elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation and
the creation of diverse student enrollments are compelling govern-
mental interests, even in a school district that is not remedying the
effects of prior discrimination. 295 Department of Education reports in
1997 and 1998 recognized that along with diversity comes rich, new
learning opportunities for students, and that a school's learning envi-
ronment is enhanced by a diverse student population. 294
D. The Importance of Diversity in the Public Education Context:
Looking Back to Brown
Instead of looking to marketplace affirmative action cases, the
Court should follow its reasoning in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Re-
gents, Brown v. Board of Education and Washington v. Seattle School
District—the case law that eliminated segregation in public schools—in
order to determine the compelling interests that racial preferencing
programs serve in public K-12 education. 295 Legal scholars propose that
290 See 20 U.S.C. § 7202 (1998); 34 C.F.R. § 280.1 (1998).
291 See 20 U.S.C. § 7205 (1998); 54 C.F.R. § 280.2 (1998).
292 See 20 U.S.C. § 7203 (1998).
255 See 34 C.F.R. Part 280, 63 Fed. Reg. 8020-8029 (Feb. 17, 1998).
294 See Department of Education, The Condition of Education 1998 (visited Feb. 24, 1999)
<http://nces.ed.gov/NCES/pubs98/condition98/c98sece.html >; Department of Education,
The Condition of Education 1997 (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://nces.ed.gov/nces/pubs/ce/
c97sece.html>.
295 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (holding that segre-
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Bakke builds "squarely on the rock of Brown."296 In addition, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts adopted the reasoning
of Brown in Wessmann I, emphasizing the importance of public schools
as the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values
and in helping him adjust normally to his environment. 297
In 1950, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the compelling edu-
cational value of student interaction in McLaurin; the value of inter-
change among students applies with added force today. 298 The Mc-
Laurin Court found the African-American plaintiff's interaction with
other students was essential to his educational experience and thus
struck down the segregative university policies. 29°Specifically, the Court
found that setting McLaurin apart from other students handicapped
his pursuit of education, by impairing and inhibiting his ability to study,
engage in discussion and exchange views with other students. 30° The
McLaurin Court's reasoning applies with substantial force today, as
recent research underscores the value of interaction that occurs at
integrated public schools. 30' Extensive pedagogical research supports
the view that desegregation connects students to a network that pro-
vides greater lifelong opportunities. 302
Segregation is perpetuated across generations in part because
African Americans and Latino/as often lack access to informal net-
works that provide information about and entrance to desegregated
institutions and employrnent. 3°3 The knowledge students need regard-
ing occupational opportunities is usually transmitted through the in-
teraction of students, school personnel and people outside the school
system, especially parents. This knowledge has been found to be more
prevalent within environments linked to the dominant white commu-
gated conditions under which an African American was required to receive his education violated
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954) (finding that segregation according to race in public schools constituted
a denial of the equal protection of the laws); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 487
(1982) (holding that the initiative which banned mandatory use of busing for racial integration
in Washington public schools is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution).
298 See Amar and Katyal, supra note 190, at 1745, 1775.
"7 See Wessmann I, 996 F. Supp. 120, 128 (D. Mass. 1998); supra note 6.
298 See 339 U.S. at 641.
2" See
300 See is
so See ORFIEI.D ET AL., supra note 205, at 106.
302 See id.
703 See Wells and Crain, supra note 196, at 532-33. Less formal interpersonal networks, such
as acquaintances or friends of friends, have a strong impact on the diffusion of influence,
information and mobility opportunities. See id.
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nity (i.e., the predominantly white school). 304 Thus, research indicates
that school desegregation will help break the cycle of segregation by
alleviating one of the mechanisms that perpetuates racial isolation:
African Americans' and Latino/as' lack of information concerning
educational opportunities and methods of attaining specific goals. 303
Recent educational research further suggests that interactions
with students from other backgrounds is beneficial not only for African
Americans, as McLaurin recognized, but for students of all races, back-
grounds and ethnicities, including white students. 306 Numerous studies
suggest that desegregation tends to lead to more positive intergroup
attitudes.307 As a result of the pervasive residential segregation in our
society, students often have their first relatively extended interracial
experiences in school; the growth or decrease of hostility and stereo-
typing may be critically influenced by circumstances occurring at
school."8 Regardless of whether schools consciously try to influence
intergroup relations, schools are extremely likely to do so in one way
or another.309 Thus, there exists a positive connection between a school
admissions policy designed to achieve student diversity and a "vigorous
exchange of ideas. "m°
Finally, the long-term benefits of students' early and continued
interaction with children of a variety of backgrounds can be traced to
the occupational environments" Research indicates that African
Americans, Latino/as and white students who attend desegregated
schools are more likely to work in racially-mixed workplaces.312 With
regard to African Americans in work settings with a greater number of
whites, the higher the percentage of white students in these African
Americans' high school, the more they considered their white co-work-
ers to be friendly. 3 " While African-American, Latino/a, and white grad-
uates of segregated schools perceive racially-mixed work groups as less
3°4 See id. at 533.
"5 See id.
3°6 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 610.
301 See id.
308 See id. at 608.
"9 See id.
3 '° See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312; Schofield, supra note 176, at 608. The ability to work effectively
with people from diverse backgrounds is an important skill for both majority and minority groups
in a pluralistic society. See Schofield, supra note 176, at 608. A report commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Labor in 1991 concluded that the ability to work effectively in a context of cultural
diversity is one of the basic competencies required to perform effectively in the U.S. labor force.
See id.
3111 See Trent, supra note 206, at 257.
311' See id,
313 see id.
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friendly than racially-homogeneous ones, respondents from desegre-
gated schools make much less of a distinction.'" Thus, the desegre-
gated school experience can reduce negative feelings toward co-work-
ers of other ethnic groups.'" Another study suggests that high school
desegregation appears to promote more positive perceptions and so-
cial contacts among African Americans and whites in racially hetero-
geneous work groups.316 Earlier experiences of African Americans in
desegregated settings, such as those in school, help to break down
social barriers by creating more accurate and positive expectations of
white reactions, by building confidence in one's ability to succeed in
racially-mixed environments and by providing practice to deal with the
strains of cross-racial contacts. 317
Similarly, social barriers among white adults to interracial contact
may be broken down by experiences in cross-racial situations earlier in
life."' When cross-racial relationships in desegregated schools reduce
white students' negative racial stereotypes and fears of hostile reactions
in interracial situations, these white students as adults will be less
resistant to admitting African Americans into co-worker friendship
groups.9 t9 Recent tabulations of racial attitude questions from national
surveys of African-American and white students further suggest that
school desegregation creates more positive reactions, among African
Americans and whites, to future interracial situations.32° Thus, while
McLaurin only began to recognize the importance of interaction with
white students to the African American's educational experience, there
is now ample evidence to support the notion that interaction with a
diverse group of students has beneficial effects for all students over the
long term.'"
As the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown evaluated the effect of seg-
regation itself on public education, the Court should evaluate the
documented long-term effects of diversity and desegregation on public
education in order to determine just how diversity serves a compelling
state interest."' While the Court in Brown reasoned that integration
314 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 610.
315 See id.
316 See Braddock and McPartland, supra note 208, at 284.
317




321 See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642.
322  See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95 (holding that segregation according to race in public
schools is a denial of the equal protection of the laws).
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was necessary because modern educational and psychological data
indicated that segregation caused the minority school children to feel
inferior, diversity in schools is compelling for an almost opposite rea-
son—so that students of "dominant" cultures do not develop a false
sense of superiority" Scholars have found that students from "domi-
nant" cultures need multicultural education more than others, for they
are often the most miseducated about diversity in our society.'" White
students often feel that their way of living, believing and acting are
simply the only possibilities and anything else is "ethnic" and "ex-
otic."323 These children are prone to develop unrealistic views of the
world and their place in it.326 Thus, a classroom devoid of diversity may
intentionally or unintentionally give white children a false sense of
superiority which later may lead to prejudice or racism, 527
As the Court in Brown found, segregation has a tendency to inhibit
the educational and mental development of African-American chil-
dren and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive
in a racially integrated school; a classroom devoid of diversity may also
retard the educational and mental development of white students. 3"
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court in Seattle School District recognized
that white as well as African-American children benefit from exposure
to ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom." The Seattle School
District Court found that when an educational environment is largely
shaped by members of different racial and ethnic groups, minority
children can achieve their full measure of success only if they learn to
function in—and are fully accepted by—the larger community.'" The
Court further recognized that attending an ethnically diverse school
may help accomplish this goal by preparing minority children for
citizenship in our pluralistic society."' Consistent with the reasoning
employed in Seattle School District, educators have found that when
323 See id. at 494-95. "Dominant cultures" are those groups that historically have not been
the subject of government discrimination. The Brown Court stated its findings regarding the
psychological effects of segregation on school children were "amply supported by modern author-
ity," including the work of Kenneth Clark and other notable social scientists. See id. at 494 & n.11.
324 See GLORIA Botrrrg, MULTI-CULTURAL EDUCATION, 112-15 (1999). "Scholars have found




3"See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
329 See458 U.S. at 472 (initiative which banned mandatory use of busing for racial integration
in Washington public schools struck down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution).
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white children are denied the richness of music, literature, lifestyles,
values and perspectives of other ethnic groups, their potential under-
standing is limited. 332 Thus, the achievement of a diverse classroom
serves the compelling interest of ensuring that all students, including
white mainstream students, develop skills for living in a pluralistic
society. 333
Recent research demonstrates the positive effects of school deseg-
regation on inter-group relations, especially interracial attitudes, fur-
ther supporting the reasoning in Seattle School District."4 Research
suggests that white students who have increased contact with African-
American and Mexican-American peers in desegregated schools de-
velop more positive attitudes toward members of these groups." 5 A
National Opinion Research Center survey in 1979 found that desegre-
gated white students were more likely to report having a close African-
American friend and having had African-American friends visit their
homes. 336
Recognizing that education is "the principal instrument in awak-
ening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment," the Court in Brown reasoned that considerations found in
McLaurin, including the ability to engage in discussions and exchange
views with other students, applied with added force to children in
grade and high schools "s7 Similarly, research indicates that desegrega-
tion which started at the beginning of elementary school and lasted
throughout the school years had larger benefits.'" Recent research also
supports the view that earlier experiences of African Americans in
desegregated settings, such as those in school, help to break down
social barriers by creating more accurate and positive expectations of
white reactions, by building confidence in one's ability to succeed in
racially-mixed environments and by providing practice dealing with the
strains of cross-racial contacts."'
332 See BourrE, supra note 324, at 112.
333
	 id. The issue of cultural diversity is a human problem, not an African American, Native
American, or Latino/a problem; as demographics of society continue to change, all students will
need to know how to effectively work with other ethnicities. See id. In 1990, the population was
primarily (76%) Anglo-American, but statistics predict that by 2050 the Anglo-American popula-
tion will decrease to 52%. See id. at in.
334 See Schofield, supra note 176, at 608-09.
"3 See id. at 610.
336
 See id.
337 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94.
333 See ()AFIELD ET AL, supra note 205, at 105.
339 See Braddock and McPartland, supra note 208, at 285.
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Although the Brown Court was criticized in 1954 for its reliance
on "the shifting sands of sociological knowledge rather than on con-
stitutional principles," since Brown, the Court has continued to give
deference to educational research findings."° More than four decades
after Brown, federal courts have continued to hear testimony from
educators and social scientists on issues related to remedying segrega-
tion."' Moreover, education experts hope to narrow the gap that exists
between the world of academic research and the world of legal policy."'
CONCLUSION
The breadth of research explored in this Note provides concrete
evidence supporting a correlation between school desegregation and
breaking the cycle of racial segregation, promoting tolerance and
increasing student achievement and opportunity over the long term."'
The First Circuit in Wessmann //found that there may be circumstances
under which a form of racial preferencing may be justified by concerns
for attaining goals articulated by the policy. 944 Thus, if a public school
admissions policy seeks to achieve student diversity in order to sig-
nificantly affect students' capacity and willingness to learn, the findings
explored in this Note support the potential attainment of that goal and
the First Circuit's criteria laid out in Wessmann H"5
In order to successfully defend their racially-sensitive admissions
policy before the U.S. Supreme Court, a school committee must create
a powerful, compelling record to defend a racial-preferencing policy,
relying not only on the testimony of administrators, but working in
concert with researchers, educators and civil rights activists to compile
and present the best possible evidence that affirmative action policies
are essential remedies to the continuing impact of discrimination." 6
The courts have continued to reject arguments for affirmative action
34° See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94; Taylor, supra note 239, at 196.
"I See Taylor, supra note 239, at 198. For example, in a 1996 hearing before Federal District
Judge George Gunn in Missouri to determine the fate of a major school desegregation plan
operating in St. Louis since 1984, the court heard front numerous education/desegregation
experts including Gary Orfield and Dr. William Trent in order to determine the effects of school
desegregration under a 1984 consent decree. See id.
342 See id. at 201. Educators and researchers are often reluctant to enter a courtroom or other
legal forum because of their fear that the legal process may not respect their need to be
independent and maintain academic integrity. See id
343 See id.
344 See 160 F.3d 790, 796-98 (1st Cir. 1998).
345 See id. at 796-800.
345 Gary Orfield, Boston Needs to Strengthen Its Case for Diversity at Latin School, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 11, 1999, at A15; Daley and Dabilis, supra note 144, at Al.
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because of the conservative notion that problems of racial discrimina-
tion have been solved and race-conscious policies are no longer just-
ifiable.347
 Yet the newest research, much of which is outlined in this
Note, indicates that multiracial, academically demanding schools pro-
vide essential educational and social benefits for all students. Thus, the
prevailing research stands in sharp contrast to the conclusions being
made by the courts.'"
JOANNA R. ZAHLER
347 See Orfield, supra note 346, at A15.
749
	 of the First Circuit's ruling in Wessmann II argue that the courts are breaking with
precedent and moving into a domain in which educators were previously considered the experts.
See Zernike, supra note 5, at B6.
